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SPECIAL ADVISORY UPDATE:
Retaliatory Attacks in
Afghanistan
September 27, 2007
This
Update supplements CCI’s earlier Special Advisory and Update
regarding the kidnapping and negotiated release of South Korean
Christian hostages from Taliban kidnappers in
Afghanistan
. The original Advisory
and Update are available at www.CriCon.org.
UPDATE:
Media and other sources report that two members of the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in
Afghanistan
today (September 27, 2007). The
two ICRC workers were reportedly part of the team that helped secure
the release of a group of South Korean Christian hostages kidnapped by
the Taliban in July. At
the time those hostages were released, a Taliban spokesman said that
“We will do the same thing with the other allies in
Afghanistan
, because we found this way to be successful."
Media reports indicate the two ICRC workers were kidnapped in
the Sayed Abad district in Wardak (some reports say they were on the
Kabul-Kandahar highway), and that the workers were accompanying a
German hostage who had just been released. The Xinhua news agency
reported that Afghan police desired to escort the ICRC workers and the
hostage to
Kabul
, but the request was denied.
This
event represents increased risk to Christian workers in
Afghanistan
.
ASSESSMENT:
This event should
be considered in the context of two situations: First, the claim by a
Taliban spokesman that additional kidnappings of expatriates in
Afghanistan would occur; and second, the fact that following the
negotiated release of the Korean hostages Afghan and U.S. military
action led to the killing or capture of a number of Taliban who were
involved in that kidnapping.
Whether today’s
kidnapping is part of a retaliatory campaign due to the military
actions against the Taliban kidnappers of the Koreans, or a result of
some dispute over the release of the German hostage; the implications
are clear: Kidnapping of ICRC staff is a significant political
statement. More than
almost any other organization, the ICRC is able to rely on its
position of neutrality during conflict as a security measure.
The ICRC has been a key participant in kidnap resolutions in
Afghanistan
and as such should have enjoyed a degree of immunity from Taliban
attack (because the Taliban needs the ICRC as a part of the process by
which kidnapping resolutions represent a successful enterprise for the
Taliban).
If, as it
appears, the Taliban are responsible for today’s kidnapping, a
significant threshold has been crossed.
This act signals that the Taliban is emboldened and feels
powerful enough to increase the risk and impact of kidnappings.
Christian
organizations and staff operating in Afghanistan are at particular
increased risk of kidnapping by the Taliban.
Most Christian organizations represent a “softer target”
than the ICRC. The kidnapping of the Koreans resulted in substantial
gain to the Taliban (refer to our earlier Advisory).
The subsequent military actions against the Taliban require it
to respond. By
choosing to attack the ICRC, the Taliban signals that it will respond
and that there are fewer and fewer “boundaries” to the type of act
it will initiate.
CCI
stands ready to support Christian agencies in the response to this
increased threat, to implement these recommendations and additional
actions, and to discuss specific issues and situations.
We remain the only Christian agency in the world that provides
real-time on-site support and assistance in crises and emergencies
without charging fees. Contact
us:
Crisis Consulting
International
9452 Telephone Rd, #223 •
Ventura, CA 93004 USA
PHONE: 805.642.2549 •
FAX: 805.642.1748
E-MAIL:
info@CriCon.org
PREVIOUS
SPECIAL ADVISORIES Regarding
the kidnapping and negotiated release of South
Korean Christian
hostages from Taliban kidnappers
in Afghanistan
.
CRISIS CONSULTING INTERNATIONAL
SPECIAL
ADVISORY UPDATE: Additional
Information
and Assessment Regarding the
Release
of South Korean Hostages
in
Afghanistan
September 4, 2007
This
Update provides additional information relating to the negotiated
release of South Korean Christian hostages from Taliban kidnappers in
Afghanistan
. The release is reprinted
in its entirety following the Update.
UPDATE:
Shortly after the
release of the final South Korean Christian hostages by the Taliban, a
spokesman for the Taliban told the Associated Press in a telephone
interview. “We will do the same thing with the other allies in
Afghanistan
, because we found this way to be successful," Qari Yousef Ahmadi
told the Associated Press via cell phone from an undisclosed location.
The statement was reported by the Associated Press (and other
agencies) on August 31, 2007. Ahmadi
has been a spokesman for the Taliban in the past (including during the
South Korean hostage event) and CCI’s assessment is that this
statement was authorized by the Taliban.
ASSESSMENT:
The August 31
statement about more kidnapping in the future was not the first
Taliban statement to this effect.
In fact, early in the South Korean hostage crisis, Ahmadi made
a similar statement, documented by Stratfor on August 6 “The
Taliban intend to continue kidnapping foreigners in
Afghanistan
regardless of whether a deal is reached to free Taliban prisoners,
purported Taliban spokesman Qari Yousef Ahmadi said Aug. 6”.
It is CCI’s assessment that these statements do not
reflect any policy change by the Taliban, but rather the maximizing of
media opportunities by a sophisticated organization.
We continue to believe that additional Taliban kidnappings are
probable. But that is not
so much based on these statements as it is on the remarkable
concessions made to secure the release of the South Korean hostages.
We do note that especially the August 31 statement “we will
do the same thing…” does add motive and incentive to the Taliban
to do just that (because boasting without action indicates weakness,
something insurgent groups will avoid at all cost).
So, in summary, we note the media statement as important but a
confirmation of existing risk.
Since the release of this original Advisory, we have received a
number of questions asking, essentially, “what group is most at risk
as a result of this situation?”
It is CCI’s assessment that the greatest risk exists for the
following:
- Any
South Korean* missionaries or Christian workers in
Afghanistan
;
- Other
expatriate missionaries or Christian workers in
Afghanistan
; and
- South
Korean* missionaries of Christian workers in other countries where
an Islamist terrorist or insurgent group with operational
capabilities exists.
It isn’t practical to quantify the relative risk to these
three groups, or to the rest of the faith-based community working in
areas where an Islamist terrorist threat exists.
What we believe, however, is that there is substantially
increased risk for the reasons cited in our original Advisory, and
that the three groups mentioned above are at the greatest risk.
*
It is very important for readers to understand that when we indicate
“South Korean” in the context of this Advisory, we are referring
to ethnic South Koreans regardless of residence or citizenship.
Residence and citizenship cannot be detected by adversaries in
the field conducting target selection – if an individual appears to
the adversary to be “South Korean” (whatever that may mean in that
adversary’s mind or experience), the increased risk attaches.
CCI
stands ready to support Christian agencies in the response to this
increased threat, to implement these recommendations and additional
actions, and to discuss specific issues and situations.
We remain the only Christian agency in the world that provides
real-time on-site support and assistance in crises and emergencies
without charging fees. Contact
us:
Crisis Consulting
International
9452 Telephone Rd, #223 •
Ventura, CA 93004 USA
PHONE: 805.642.2549 •
FAX: 805.642.1748
E-MAIL:
info@CriCon.org
Original Advisory
August 29, 2007
SUMMARY
The release of the
surviving 19 South Korean hostages held by the Taliban in
Afghanistan
since July 19, 2007 carries very real increased risk to missionaries
and faith-based workers.
1.
The South Korean government made an agreement with the Taliban
to ban future missionary activity in
Afghanistan
, a watershed event that had been resisted in prior hostage
negotiations for kidnapped Christians.
2.
The Taliban, now an insurgency (or, at best, a non-state actor)
rather than an incumbent government, was able to elevate itself by
directly engaging a state (
South Korea
) in negotiations.
The circumstances of the negotiations
and the agreement leading to the release will increase the probability
of future kidnappings of Christian missionaries and relief workers in
Afghanistan
and other venues.
ANALYSIS
We need to begin by
clearly stating that it is not the purpose or intent of this Advisory
or the intention of CCI to criticize the actions of the South Korean
government and other participants in the process that led to the
release of these hostages. We
have “been there and done that” (serving as the hostage
negotiators for kidnapped missionaries) and appreciate that there are
always dynamics and factors known only to the negotiators and
decision-makers. However,
there are often unintended or unavoidable consequences resulting from
hostage negotiations, and in this case those consequences include
clear, foreseeable and imminent risk to others.
Our objective is to inform about that increased risk, not to
judge or criticize the process and decisions that may have led to it.
Shortly after the
July 19 kidnapping of 23 South Korean Christians in
Afghanistan
, the government of South Korean publicly entered the negotiation
process and sent a high-ranking delegation to
Afghanistan
. This delegation
ultimately negotiated with representatives of the Taliban in a process
at least passively condoned by the Afghan and
U.S.
governments. The
negotiation process appeared to gain traction following the execution
of two of the hostages.
Original demands
of the Taliban included a ransom and the release of Taliban prisoners
held by various governments. These
have been typical Taliban demands in kidnapping cases since its
overthrow in 2001 by
U.S.
led forces. The prisoner
release demand is common almost to the point of routine in these types
of hostage events; however, the agreement by the Afghan government to
free Taliban prisoners in exchange for a kidnapped Italian journalist
in March, 2007 sent a loud, clear signal to the Taliban (and every
other group in the world that engages in hostage taking).
The kidnapping of the South Korean Christians almost certainly
was committed with an expectation that a prisoner release was a
realistic possibility. However,
international condemnation of the Afghan government’s March deal
resulted in a return to prisoner release being one of the
“non-negotiables” during this hostage negotiation.
This likely left the negotiators (on both sides) in a “now
what do we do?” dilemma. The
killing of two hostages resulted in the desired pressure on the South
Korean government to find a resolution; and most likely even the most
ardent Taliban realized that the group could not weather the
retaliation certain to result from the execution of all 23 of the
hostages. Some suitable
alternative demand/concession had to be identified.
We don’t know whether the demand to ban South Korean
missionaries from
Afghanistan
originated with the Taliban or was an offer extended by
South Korea
. From a risk assessment
perspective, it doesn’t matter.
The result is a situation where a terrorist kidnapping of
Christian workers resulted in an agreement to remove (prevent from
returning) a group of Christian missionaries from an entire nation
that the antagonist does not control.
Not only in
Afghanistan
, but in any location where there is a clash of Christian and Moslem
evangelism, Islamist terrorists and insurgents will take note of
South Korea
’s concession.
The removal of
Christian missionaries from any location has been an absolute
non-negotiable in all hostage cases CCI has been aware of or involved
in since 1983. This
non-negotiable standard has only been broached once in the post –
9/11 era to our knowledge. In that case representatives of the
U.S.
government insisted on inserting themselves as negotiators for
kidnapped missionaries in an event perpetrated by Islamist terrorists
with al Qaeda affiliation. The
U.S.
negotiators then offered the withdrawal of all Christian missionaries
from the region in question as an alternative to a ransom being
demanded by the hostage takers. The
Christian community, supported by CCI, banded together in that case
and prevailed on the
U.S.
government to withdraw the offer.
Now, however, an
event has occurred with a highly-publicized concession by a modern
state to withdraw (or prevent from going) Christian missionaries from
an entire country; this action as a direct result of the kidnapping of
other Christian missionaries. The
implications are serious and predictable.
We can expect to see additional future kidnappings of Christian
workers (whether missionaries or relief workers) with attendant
demands that Christian workers leave the area.
The patterns of terrorist activities in general and the
patterns of hostage events specifically indicate that actions that
succeed are repeated. This
Taliban kidnapping succeeded (perhaps not with the original goal, but
with a result of arguably equal or greater impact).
Others will desire to replicate it, and some will almost
certainly attempt to do so. Although
the most likely venue for additional future events is
Afghanistan
, the global publicity of this event and the global reach of Islamist
terrorism make future events foreseeable in any venue where Christian
workers and Islamist terrorists coexist.
There is a second factor in this event that will increase the
risk of future kidnappings in similar environments.
The Taliban was displaced as a government in 2001 and functions
now as an insurgent group (or, very charitably, a ‘non-state
actor’). Insurgent
groups almost always have an objective of increasing their presence
and influence on the political stage, and the Taliban certainly fits
this profile. During this
kidnapping event, the Taliban was able to sit down at the negotiating
table with a legitimate state, the government of
South Korea
. Even the use of
intermediaries does not mitigate the fact that the participants were
the Taliban and the government of
South Korea
. For that period of time,
i.e., while those negotiations were under way, the Taliban enjoyed an
elevated political status that was a de
facto result of
South Korea
agreeing to negotiate with them. The
lesson learned by the Taliban: This kidnapping elevated their
political status, at least for a time.
That is a lesson seldom missed by insurgent groups.
The result is a second, but also powerful motive for similar
future kidnappings.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1.
All Christian agencies working in
Afghanistan
should immediately review their operations and security procedures in
light of this new, changed environment.
2.
The nature of the increased risk should be immediately
communicated to all Christian workers (missionary and others) working
in
Afghanistan
.
3.
Christian agencies in
Afghanistan
should immediately update their risk assessments in light of this new,
changed environment.
4.
Christian agencies in any part of the world where Islamist
terrorist activities exist should review their operations, risk
assessments and security procedures in light of this new, changed
environment.
5.
Christian agencies in
Afghanistan
and other parts of the world where Islamist terrorist activities exist
should communicate clear guidelines and instructions to all of their
staff in the security procedures of profile management, avoidance of
routines and predictability, target hardening and the detection and
management of surveillance.
6.
CCI recommends the convening of a forum where Christian sending
agencies can review this development, share experiences and best
practices, and consider strategies to inform governments of the
unacceptable nature of concessions of this type in missionary
kidnapping cases. We will
work with agencies such as the EFMA and IFMA to facilitate such a
forum.
CCI stands ready to support Christian
agencies in the response to this increased threat, to implement these
recommendations and additional actions, and to discuss specific issues
and situations. We remain
the only Christian agency in the world that provides real-time on-site
support and assistance in crises and emergencies without charging
fees. Contact us:
Crisis
Consulting International
9452 Telephone Rd, #223 •
Ventura, CA 93004 USA
PHONE: 805.642.2549 •
FAX: 805.642.1748
E-MAIL:
info@CriCon.org
© 2007 Crisis Consulting
International. Permission is granted to Christian non-profit agencies
to reproduce and distribute this Advisory in its entirety only and
with attribution to CCI. All
other rights reserved
CCI
Special Advisories are automatically sent to those on our
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