Although CCI has had only a limited advisory role in this case, we are in regular contact with personnel directly involved in attempting to secure this woman’s release.

Through very reliable sources involved in that case, CCI has received a recommendation regarding the actions of personnel from like-minded agencies in Yemen.  The nature of the information is time-sensitive and provocative.  However, the information is such that CCI feels publishing this information on an open website such as ours could exacerbate the ongoing kidnapping resolution process and potentially serve as an idea-stimulater for adversaries in Yemen.

Therefore, to receive this information, you need to:

1)  Send an email to rklamser@cricon.org, asking for the information; and

2) Verify that you are presently responsible for staff (expatriate, national or local hires) working in Yemen; and

3) Send your email through a URL pre-esbalished as that of a like-minded organization; or, within the email identify your organization and identify a senior official of the organization who can verify your status (including providing an email address (mandatory and phone number (desired) for that official.

CCI trusts that you will appreciate the sensitivity of the situation and the requirement that requesters be vetted before sensitive information is provided.

Finally, your requesting of and receipt of this information serves as your personnel commitment before Christ that you will not disclose the information outside your organization; and that within your organization distribution will be limited to those with a legitimate “need to know” the information.

If you have any questions or concerns, please email me directly at rklamser@cricon.org.

Some NGOs and FBOs have relocated staff (especially international/expatriate staff) to Juba as a precautionary measure.  Some organizations have also determined that bombings of military facilities in the northern part of South Sudan by Sudanese military forces is a trigger point for evacuation of personnel out of South Sudan (including personnel in Juba).

FBOs with operations and personnel in South Sudan are encouraged to maintain 24/7 contact through their security networks, to have evacuation and shelter-in-place plans updated (daily if necessary) and to insure that communications are in place to maintain contact and provide updates and directives to staff (especially in remote areas).

The U.S. Embassy issued the following emergency message April 12:

“The U.S Embassy in South Sudan is issuing this security message to alert U.S.  citizens, especially those located in the areas along the border between South Sudan and Sudan, to the potential hazard of travel in South Sudan.  Due to the conflict in the border areas between South Sudan and Sudan, the Embassy advises U.S. citizens to depart all border states.”

Members of Guinea-Bissau‘s armed forces launched a coup attempt in central Bissau on the night of 12/13 April. Soldiers have taken control of the ruling party’s headquarters and the national radio station in the central district of the capital, Bissau. Gunfire and grenade explosions were reported throughout the night near the residence of Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior. Main roads in central Bissau have been blocked by soldiers and reports indicate that several political leaders, including current interim president, Raimudo Pereira, have been arrested and taken to the city’s d’Amura barracks. Guinea-Bissau held presidential elections on March 18 following the death of former interim president, Malam Bacai Sanha, who died in Paris on 9 January as a result of a prolonged illness. In the presidential election, Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior garnered 48.9 percent, while opposition leader Kumba Yala obtained 23.26 percent of the vote. Yala claims that the vote was rigged and is calling for a boycott of the run-off vote, scheduled for 29 April. Guinea-Bissau has a history of political instability and regime change. Since gaining independence in 1974, the country has experienced four military-led coups with the most recent occurring on 1 March 2009 when then president Joao Bernardo Vieira was assassinated by members of the country’s armed forces. Following his death and the ensuing political instability, soldiers attempted to overthrow the interim government of Sanha on 26 December 2011. However, the coup, led by navy chief Bubo Na Tchuto, and several other high-ranking military commanders, failed. The situation in Bissau remains highly fluid and a coup by factions of the military and further associated violence cannot be ruled out. Clients in Bissau are advised to avoid non-essential travel at this time and should monitor local media and emergency broadcast channels for developments.

This corresponds with other public information available concerning threats in Kenya during this Easter season.

“Hot Spots” released the following statement today: “According to reports on 4 April 2012, Nigerian authorities have increased security in cities throughout northern Nigeria ahead of the Easter holiday weekend over concerns that extremists may attempt to carry out attacks during this period. Reports indicate that security is especially high in Kano, where the radical Islamist sect Boko Haram killed nearly 185 people in coordinated bombings and shooting attacks in January 2012. Additional foot patrols, searches and checkpoints have already been put in place. Boko Haram commonly carries out attacks in northern cities on Christian holidays. For example, on Christmas Day 2011, attacks took place at churches in Madala, which is located just outside Abuja; Jos, Plateau state; and Gadaka and Damaturu, Yobe state.”

The US Embassy in Abuja issued the following warden’s message, also today: “The Government of Nigeria has declared Friday, April 6 and Monday, April 9 public holidays.  With the history of attacks throughout Nigeria during previous holiday weekends, nearly daily attacks in northern Nigeria, and the current media reporting of continued threats, including several that mention U.S. interests, the U.S. Mission in Nigeria urges all U.S. citizens living and traveling in Nigeria to take extra precautions for your personal security and safety.

The U.S. Embassy advises all U.S. citizens in the Federal Capital Territory and other large northern Nigerian cities to remain particularly vigilant around churches and other places of worship, locations where large crowds may gather, and areas frequented by expatriates and foreign travelers during the upcoming holiday weekend.  The Nigerian Security Services have heightened security measures in Nigeria as a result of threats posed by extremist groups, and U.S. citizens should expect additional police and military checkpoints, additional security, and possible road blocks throughout the country during the holiday weekend.”

CCI concurs that there is a significant threat of Boko Haram terrorist activity against Christian targets, including any assemblies of worship, over this Easter period. The specific threat to Kano cannot be discounted; however, the threat is definitely not limited to Kano.  The threat is significant anywhere Boko Haram has previously operated. We assess Jos to be at particular risk given recent and blatant Boko Haram attacks there.

As a faith-based organization, CCI is extremely reluctant to counsel avoiding worship services, particularly at Easter.  However, worshippers should be aware of the risks and make personal decisions accordingly.  Recommendations for mitigating the threat of attacks at worship assemblies include:

1. Maintaining vigilant observation and awareness around places of worship assembly 24/7 during this period; paying close attention for an adversary conducting surveillance (vehicles parked for extended periods, vehicles circling or returning frequently to the location, individuals loitering for extended periods outside the facility, individuals coming to the facility with suspicious or nonsensical requests in order to observe interiors, staffing, etc.).
2. Requesting local officials to station uniformed police or security personnel outside places of worship assembly during this period.
3. Maintaining close communication with both like-minded agencies and with local officials (especially JTF officials if present) concerning trends, new information, etc.
4. Consider banning parking of vehicles close-in to places of worship assembly and using staff and trusted parishioners’ vehicles to create an encircling barrier around the perimeter of worship locations (forming a temporary and “free” barrier to VBIEDs (car bombs).
5. During worship assemblies, station observers outside the facility with air horns, whistles or other loud signals to warn worshippers inside of an imminent threat, so they can be directed away from windows and to the closest places of protection (even under/between pews).
6. If threat information for a specific location warrants it, consider banning any carry-ons (purses, briefcases, backpacks, etc.) into worship assemblies and even searching those entering the location (if there is a credible threat).

Reliable sources on the ground reported on March 27 that BCEAO (a regional banking consortium supporting Mali banks) were closing all banks.  Some international customers were able to withdraw some funds yesterday, but indications were that cash on hand was limited at most Mali banking outlets and the ability to withdraw future funds may be in question.

There are also conflicting reports regarding flights. There are unconfirmed reports that Air France has cancelled operations to and from Mali through March 31, but that other (regional) airlines were operating but with full flights and very limited availability.

Our (reliable) sources on the ground do report that these conditions notwithstanding, things are relatively calm on the ground.

Here is the relevant text of the updated travel warning from the US Dept. of State:

“The U.S. Department of State warns U.S. citizens against all travel to Mali at this time because of current political instability in the country, an active rebellion in the north, and continuing threats of attacks and kidnappings of Westerners in the north of the country.  Malian mutineers continue to control the country; however, the country’s land borders and airport have re-opened. Radio and television stations are on the air, but under the control of the mutineers.  The situation on the ground remains fluid and unpredictable.  The U.S. Department of State urges U.S. citizens in Mali to consider their own personal security and contingency plans, including temporary departure from Mali.  This Travel Warning replaces the Travel Warning for Mali dated March 23, 2012, to update information on current events in Mali.

Senou International Airport in Bamako is currently open for business.  U.S. citizens currently living in Mali, who are considering a temporary departure from the country in light of the current security situation, should check with commercial airlines for flight and seat availability before traveling to the airport.”

CCI has receive reports from several mission agencies that there is sporadic fighting in the streets, including in the capitol, but that the fighting is generally restricted to military and security units.  As yet, we have not seen reports of widespread rioting, looting, etc.

CCI recommends that agencies and personnel in Mali follow organizational contingency plans; generally shelter in place in secure locations, and maintain communications with their offices, dispersed personnel, and colleagues in like-minded organizations.

One recent media account of the situation is available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17462111 .

Based on this new information, the best assessment of the 13 March kidnapping of the Swiss teacher was a localized event perpetrated by tribesmen, similar to many other kidnappings of expatriates by tribesmen in Yemen.  Based on the information provided to us by reliable sources today, CCI believes that the kidnapping was planned and executed independent of any Islamist terrorist/al Qaeda participation.  However, we continue to consider the possibility that the kidnap event, with the resulting publicity and statements linking it to al Qaeda, may have accelerated the timetable of previously-planned terrorist attacks against international school targets.  In other words, the 18 March assassination of the American teacher may have occurred when, how and where it did because the perpetrators were inspired or motived by; or even competing with, the publicity surrounding the earlier kidnapping.

The threat information contained in CCI’s post yesterday is repeated here:

“A claim sent via text to media outlets within hours of the Taiz assassination claimed responsibility by the group Ansar al-Sharia, which is reportedly affiliated with al Qaeda elements.  The statement said “This operation comes as a response to the campaign of Christian proselytizing that the West (sic) has launched agains Muslims”.

CCI has been told by multiple sources that Islamic terrorist groups in Yemen have threatened Christian faith-based organizations in recent months.  At least one threat specified international schools and claimed that these schools are “fronts” for proselytizing by Christians and warned Yemenis to stay away from all such schools because the schools were targets.” We consider this information to be still valid.

In any event, the information concerning threats issued to international schools, their staff and students; by Islamist terrorists in the weeks before these events remains validated from multiple sources.  CCI continues to assess the risk to these organizations, their expatriate staff, their national employees and their students as being very high.

Recommended actions include:

• Increased awareness of activities that may indicate surveillance at any facility, home, church or other location frequented by such staff.
• Rapid communication of all suspicious events, sightings and other circumstances both throughout the involved organization, and also between all like-minded organizations in the area.
• Immediate steps to change daily patterns of activity and avoiding all predictable behavior. This may include changing the time of daily movements; changing the routes traveled; and changing vehicles and/or other means of travel; all in random patterns.
• Communicate a shelter-in-place policy in secure locations for all staff – staff should know where and how to rapidly shelter-in-place in the most secure room or setting possible at all times.
• Update all security contingency plans.
• Update (or create if they don’t exist) evacuation plans for all potentially affected staff.

Yemeni and Swiss officials first described the Hodeida event as being typical of tribal kidnappings that are not uncommon in the region and are normally resolved without injury to the hostage(s).  However, in recent days anonymous Yemeni government officials have made several statements to the media that this kidnapping was in fact perpetrated by an al Qaeda entity.

A claim sent via text to media outlets within hours of the Taiz assassination claimed responsibility by the group Ansar al-Sharia, which is reportedly affiliated with al Qaeda elements.  The statement said “This operation comes as a response to the campaign of Christian proselytizing that the West (sic) has launched agains Muslims”.

CCI has been told by multiple sources that Islamic terrorist groups in Yemen have threatened Christian faith-based organizations in recent months.  At least one threat specified international schools and claimed that these schools are “fronts” for proselytizing by Christians and warned Yemenis to stay away from all such schools because the schools were targets.

It is too early to fully assess these events, and not all claims of responsibility come from the actual perpetrators. Although there are multiple reports claiming the first event (the kidnapping in Hodeida) is linked operationally to the Taiz assassination, at this point all of the information CCI has received about any such linkage has been speculative (but not inherently implausible).

CCI is in the process of seeking additional information from multiple sources. However, at this time we believe that these events represents a significant threat to other expatriate (“western”) faith-based personnel, organizations and programs in Yemen. Even if these two events are unrelated, their proximity in time combined with media speculation can create a synergy of momentum targeting others believed to be related to the first two events.

Although only expatriates have been attacked in this immediate cycle, if indeed al Qaeda affiliated organizations are involved, it is also very possible that the threat can extend to national (Yemeni) employees, clients and colleagues and associates of targeted “western” organizations. We recommend that any organizations that could be believed or even suspected of having Christian origins and/or any ministry objectives in Yemen take appropriate security measures to mitigate this threat as much as possible. CCI stresses that the threat originates with suspicions and perceptions of terrorist organizations that are pre-disposed to link almost any “western” non-governmental organization in Yemen to Christian proselytizing.  The threat originates from the perception, and not any actual structure or strategy of a particular organization or entity.

Recommended actions include:

• Increased awareness of activities that may indicate surveillance at any facility, home, church or other location frequented by such staff.
• Rapid communication of all suspicious events, sightings and other circumstances both throughout the involved organization, and also between all like-minded organizations in the area.
• Immediate steps to change daily patterns of activity and avoiding all predictable behavior. This may include changing the time of daily movements; changing the routes traveled; and changing vehicles and/or other means of travel; all in random patterns.
• Communicate a shelter-in-place policy in secure locations for all staff – staff should know where and how to rapidly shelter-in-place in the most secure room or setting possible at all times.
• Update all security contingency plans.
• Update (or create if they don’t exist) evacuation plans for all potentially affected staff.