TECHNICAL BULLETIN:  PRE-FIELD DOCUMENTATION

Revised February 28, 2002

Crisis Consulting International is frequently asked what types of legal documentation, waivers, etc. that their members should complete, and the organization have on file, before international Christian workers go to the field.  We have traditionally been very cautious in responding to these requests, because we are not attorneys and it is improper for us to give legal advice.  However, because of the high interest in this subject, we have developed a listing of the issues that we recommend be covered through appropriate legal instruments.  Every organization should seek counsel from qualified attorneys to determine its specific needs, and to create documents of the appropriate content and form for their own circumstances.  This listing should be considered a starting point for discussions with legal counsel.  

Personal Documents  

1.         Will or trust.  We recommend that all members have a current will or trust, specifically naming Godparents or specifying parents’ instructions for care and custody of minor children.  

2.         Advance medical directive.  We recommend that all members be asked if they desire to specify any advance medical directives, and if so, that legal review be sought to insure adequacy of those directives.  

3.         Organ donations.  We recommend that all members be asked if they have preferences or desires regarding organ donation and if so, that legal review be sought to insure adequacy of organ donation documents.  

Organizational Policy Documents  

4.         Acknowledgement of/agreement with key policies.  We recommend that members sign a statement that acknowledges receiving, understanding and accepting key policies.  “Key policies” should include those that have potential impact on the life, safety or health of members (for example, “no ransom” policies, medical evacuation policies, etc.).  Copies of the actual policy documents should be a part of these acknowledgements.  

Crisis Management Policy Documents  

5.         Acknowledgement of risk/informed choice.  In addition to the traditional “hold harmless” and liability waiver documents (which are important), we recommend a specific acknowledgement of risk and informed choice document.  This document should be specific as to potential dangers faced in any field assignment, and also specific as to potential dangers unique or localized to the field the member will be assigned to.  At a minimum, the member should be provided the most current country profile (with all cautions and travel advisories) issued by the member’s host government (and also by the government of incorporation of the sending agency, if different).  The organization should be able to document that each member was informed of potential risks associated with a field assignment, and with specific risks associated with the country of assignment, and that the member made an informed choice to accept the assignment after having received the information on risk.  By specifying the country profile prepared by the member’s own government, and by the government “responsible” for the sending entity, we do not suggest that those profiles necessarily represent an adequate threat or risk briefing.  We only suggest them as a minimum standard that organizations consider.  Put another way, we recommend that the sending entity at least be able to document that the member was briefed as to what his or her own government considered the risks to be.  

6.         Limited power of attorney.  We recommend that members execute a limited power of attorney authorizing the sending entity to act on their behalf in certain security-related situations.  Generally, this power of attorney should come into force if the member is unable to act on his or her own behalf due to arrest and imprisonment, kidnapping or hostage taking, or any other situation where the ability of the member to act is removed or substantially impaired by external, hostile actions or forces.  The power of attorney should include a presumption of duress regarding any statements made by the member if imprisoned, in custody, or kidnapped or taken hostage.  The power of attorney should expressly appoint the sending entity to represent the member in resolving the underlying event or circumstance, managing the member’s affairs (including care of minors), interacting with governments, and in all public statements (including media statements).    

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TECHNICAL BULLETIN: DEALING WITH THREATS

Revised October 24, 2001  

Threats to Christian organizations will be a matter of increasing concern, and probably also increasing frequency, following the September 11 terrorist attacks on U.S. targets.  Indeed, as this Bulletin is prepared one large Christian missionary organization is assessing and responding to what has been evaluated to be a credible threat, linked to the September 11 attacks, but not something originated as a response to, or copycat of, the September 11 attacks.  

Although threats can be presented in a wide variety of ways, by far the most common are letters and telephone calls.  This Bulletin provides information to assist organizations in their response to these two most common types of threats.  

You will find attached two checklists of procedures – one for the mailroom, and one for telephone operators or receptionists.  It may be that in your particular organization there may be other staff or workstations that also need this information.  The most important factor is to do everything possible to prepare all the personnel who will most likely be the “first recipient” of mailed or telephoned threats.   

However, these checklists are not sufficient in and of themselves.  Training of personnel, which includes familiarization with these checklists, is vital.  So is an organizational commitment to the procedures these checklists represent.  That organizational commitment includes an understanding that diligent compliance may result in alerts that are ultimately found to involve innocent communications.  The organization with an appropriate mindset about security will not punish “false alarms”, but rather will reward the integrity of the process and the courage of the staff who report suspicious circumstances.  The adage “rather 99 false alarms than miss 1 real threat” absolutely applies.  But, it will only work if the organization accepts not only the principle, but the practice.  

A final note: These procedural checklists have multiple applications:  Non-specific threats,  suspected bombs and potential chemical attacks.  The mailroom checklist includes recognition procedures, and then specific procedures for suspected threat letters/packages, and specific procedures for suspected bombs or chemical attacks.  The telephone checklist includes specific procedures for both circumstances as well.

CRITICAL TELEPHONE CALL PROCEDURE

The principle of the Critical Telephone Call Procedure is to gather as much critical information as possible before the caller disconnects.  That is why the order of questions is important.  

FOLLOW THESE PROCEDURES DURING THE CALL ITSELF:
QUESTION TO ASK	CALL-TAKER’S NOTES
“Repeat what you just said, please?”
“When will this happen?”
“Where will it happen?”
(IF the call is a bomb threat):  “How many bombs are there?”
(IF the call is a bomb threat):  “Where are the bombs located?”
(IF the call is a bomb threat):  “What do the bombs look like?”
(ALL calls):  “Why are you doing this?”
(ALL calls):  “Why did you choose us?”
(ALL calls):  “What do you want?”
(ALL calls):  “Why did you call me?”
AFTER CALL ENDS, MAKE NOTIFICATIONS REQUIRED BY ORGANIZATIONAL POLICY
IMMEDIATELY AFTER NOTIFICATIONS, ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:
What time was the call received:
What number or line was called?
Did the caller ask for a specific person, office, etc,?
Was the caller male or female?
How old did the caller sound?
What language did the caller speak?
Did you detect any accent?  What accent?
Could you tell the most likely nationality of the caller?
Could you tell the most likely ethnicity of the caller?
What was the emotional state of the caller?  Calm? Excited?  Angry? Frightened? Uncertain?
What was the rate of speech?  Slow? Normal ? Rapid? Excited?
What was the volume of the speaker’s voice? Soft? Normal ? Loud?
What was the voice quality of the caller? Nothing unusual? Slurred? High-pitched? Deep? Sincere? Rational? Irrational? Calm? Angry? Profane? Religious?
Did the caller use any foreign words or terms?  Technical words or terms? Slang or jargon?
Did the caller’s voice sound familiar?
Who is the person you know whose voice sounds most like the caller’s?
Did you hear any background noises? Voices?  Traffic? Other?

Write down exactly what the caller said, using his or her own words:
Name and telephone number(s) of staff member who received the call:

Rev. 10/12/01

SUSPICIOUS LETTER AND PACKAGE PROCEDURES

·        REMEMBER:  Suspicious packages and letters do not have to be delivered by a carrier.  They may be delivered directly by the perpetrator or an agent  

·        These procedures apply to potential BOMBS and CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL devices.  

·        ALWAYS:  Treat packages and letters that reach the threshold of suspicion as a potential bomb.  They should be evaluated as potential bombs (see procedures below) first, and then examined to see if they are written threats without the presence of explosives.  

·        THERE IS NO SET “CRITERIA”:  A package or letter does not have to match a specific number of the criteria examples below.  The totality of the circumstances, and the instincts of those who receive/see the item, must be considered.  For example, a package or letter might appear completely innocent when checked against these criteria; however, the nature of delivery, demeanor and appearance of the person making the delivery, or similar circumstances may be more than enough to trigger action.  

EXAMPLES OF CRITERIA FOR SUSPICION:  

1.      Handwritten addresses when something more professional would be expected.  

2.      Incorrect titles, names or addressing information.  

3.      Improper spelling.  

4.      Use of generic titles (e.g., “President”, “C.E.O.”, etc.).  

5.      Restrictive addressing notes (e.g., “Personal and Confidential”, etc.).  

6.      Provocative sender names/addresses (e.g., “Bin Laden Company”).  

7.      No return address or nonsensical return address.  

8.      Any packages wrapped in string (modern packaging methods have virtually eliminated the need for string).  

9.      No postage.  

10. Non-cancelled postage (stamps placed but item not mailed).  

11. Excess postage.  

12. If the item feels lopsided or heavier than it “should be.”  

13. If a letter feels “stiff,” inflexible, or as though there were a frame inside the envelope.

14. Any protruding or detectable wires or electronic components.  

15. Any fluid leaks, stains or peculiar “feel” to the item.  

16. Any powder, dust or similar covering, debris or “feel.”  

17. Any unusual/unexplained odor.  

18. Packages and parcels not expected (not a normal vendor or supplier) and you are unable to quickly verify that the item is legitimate (either by checking with the sender, or by checking with the addressee).  

19. Any item similar in any way to a previous threat.  

20. Any item associated with anonymous or suspicious calls asking if the item has been received.  

PROCEDURES TO FOLLOW WHEN A SUSPICIOUS LETTER OR PACKAGE IS IDENTIFIED: 

1.                  Do not handle the item, other than to carefully set it down (somewhere in plain sight).  Do not put anything on top of the item.  

2.                  Do not use any cordless or cellular phone, or any radio device.  

3.                  Evacuate the immediate area.  Have evacuees take personal items such as briefcases, backpacks, and all electronic communications devices with them.  

4.                  Wash your hands thoroughly.  

5.                  Make sure that the area is closed or guarded so people do not enter the danger zone.  

6.                  Make notifications pursuant to the organization’s emergency plan (building or organizational security, management, police, etc.).  Report whether the suspicions relate to an explosive device, a chemical/biological threat, or both.  

7.                  Make sure that the finder is accessible for law enforcement, management, etc.  They will want very specific information about the item and the person’s observations before they begin their work.

PROCEDURES TO FOLLOW WHEN A LETTER IS DETERMINED TO BE A THREAT, BUT THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF A BOMB AND NO EVIDENCE OF CHEMICALS, ETC.  

1.                  Stop handling the letter!  As soon as you determine that the letter is or may be a threat, a primary objective is to preserve evidence such as fingerprints.  

2.                  Carefully, using tweezers or similar tools, place each item (all pages, and the envelope) in a clear plastic covering (the fold-over, three-hole punched type is best). 

3.                  Make clear, one-to-one size photocopies of all sides of all items.  

4.                  Take photographs of the original items.  

5.                  Security and/or management personnel should turn the original item over to the appropriate authorities, but only after sufficient copies are retained.  

Rev. 10/24/2001

 

Crisis Consulting International
9452 Telephone Rd, #223 • Ventura, CA 93004 USA
PHONE: 805.642.2549 • FAX: 805.642.1748
E-MAIL: info@CriCon.org